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What Happens to Banks When House Prices Fall?
U.S. Regional Housing Busts of the 1980s and 1990s
David C. Wheelock
mortgage debt market and thereby increase the
losses lenders experience on loan defaults. The
popularity of nontraditional mortgage loans,
such as interest-only loans and adjustable-rate
loans that permit negative amortization (“option
ARMS”), raises additional concern about default
risk because such loans expose borrowers to more
interest-rate and house-price risk than traditional
fixed-rate, amortizing loans.
This article explores the implications of a
substantial decline in nominal house prices by
revisiting episodes of large decline in house prices
that occurred in several U.S. states during the
1980s and 1990s. States that experienced large
declines in residential real estate prices tended
to suffer more bank distress, and longer and deeper
declines in economic activity, than did other
states. Several states have recently experienced
increases in house prices that rival rates of appre-
ciation experienced by states that subsequently
saw marked house price declines in the 1980s
and 1990s. In the aggregate, however, U.S. banks
H
ouse prices in the United States
have soared over the past five years.
A common measure of the trend in
house prices is the repeat sales
index produced by the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). According to this
measure, between 2001:Q1 and 2005:Q3, U.S.
house prices increased by an average of 40 per-
cent in nominal terms and 29 percent relative to
the consumer price index (excluding the shelter
component of the CPI). This rapid appreciation
has led some analysts to forecast a correction in
real house prices—possibly even a decline in
nominal prices.
A decline in nominal house prices would
reduce household wealth, which could restrain
the growth of consumer expenditures and overall
economic activity. Mortgage default rates could
increase sharply if a decline in house prices were
accompanied by slower growth of household
income or rising interest rates. Furthermore, a
decline in house prices would reduce the value
of collateral behind the $8 trillion residential
The recent rapid appreciation of house prices in many U.S. markets has prompted concern over
the possible effects of a sharp decline in prices, especially for commercial banks and other real
estate lenders. This article examines regional real estate booms and busts in the 1980s and 1990s:
Only about half of state house price booms were followed by a severe decline in prices, but large
declines occurred in several states that did not have a prior boom. Banks in states that had large
house price declines experienced high loan default rates and, thus, low profit and high failure rates.
Although U.S. banks may have become more exposed to residential real estate recently, they appear
less vulnerable to a decline in house prices than banks in states with large price declines in the
earlier period. (JEL G210, R110, R310)
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 appear less vulnerable to a decline in house prices
today than did banks located in states that expe-
rienced large declines in house prices in those
earlier decades. Further, state-level data from the
1980s and 1990s show that periods of rapid house
price appreciation were not frequently followed
by large declines in house prices (and, by the same
token, that large declines were not always pre-
ceded by large house price increases).
The next section reviews the recent rapid
appreciation of U.S. house prices. Subsequent
sections present information about state housing
booms and busts during the 1980s and 1990s,
compare the exposure of U.S. commercial banks
to residential real estate during 2005 with expo-
sure levels at the height of state housing booms
in the 1980s and 1990s, and offer conclusions.
THE RECENT BOOM
Since 2000, U.S. house prices have risen
rapidly relative to conventional measures of fun-
damentals, such as rents and household income.
Rental rates, or a measure of the rental-equivalent
for owner-occupied housing, represent the flow
of income (or services) derived from ownership of
a house. Rent is thus analogous to the dividends
one receives from ownership of corporate stock.
Many analysts argue that house prices and rents
should grow at similar rates over the long term.
Similarly, house prices are often measured against
personal or household income under the presump-
tion that the growth rates of house prices and
income cannot diverge for long periods.
Three common relative measures of the growth
of U.S. house prices are plotted in Figure 1: (i)
the OFHEO repeat sales house price index (HPI)
divided by the consumer price index (excluding
the shelter component of the CPI); (ii) the HPI
divided by an index of property rental rates; (iii)
the HPI divided by median household income. By
these measures, house prices broke above their
long-run averages in 2000, rose during the 2001
recession, and continued to rise through 2005.1
U.S. averages fail to convey the considerable
variation across markets in the extent to which
house prices have risen. In general, prices have
risen the most rapidly on the coasts, especially
in California and southern Florida markets.
Figure 2 illustrates the variation in HPI to income
across selected states. Between 2000 and 2004, the
standard deviation of HPI to median household
income across all states nearly doubled. 
Economists disagree about whether house
prices have become “too high” relative to funda-
mentals, even in markets that have seen excep-
tional price appreciation. Although conventional
measures suggest that U.S. house prices are over-
valued in many markets, carrying costs have
fallen, mainly because of a decline in long-term
real interest rates.2 Still, historically, price/income
and price/rent ratios have exhibited long-run mean
reversion (Gallin, 2004; Malpezzi, 1999). In this
environment, many observers believe that an
increase in long-term interest rates would exert
considerable downward pressure on house prices,
which could have substantial negative impacts
on lenders and economic activity in general.3
HOUSING BUSTS OF THE PAST
The United States has not experienced a
large, nationwide decline in nominal house prices
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Several
cities and a few states have experienced large
declines in recent memory, however, as have some
countries.4
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2 See Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) for more on the deficien-
cies of conventional measures and an attempt at a more accurate
measurement of the fundamentals. In addition, the HPI has various
shortcomings (as do alternative measures), and some alternative
aggregate measures of house prices show less appreciation.
3 Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001) estimate the effects of changes
in housing market and financial market wealth on household con-
sumption using data for U.S. states and for 14 developed countries.
They find that changes in housing wealth have a much larger
impact on consumption than do changes in stock market wealth.
Similarly, Helbling and Terrones (2004) find that large declines in
house prices have typically led to larger declines in economic
activity than have large declines in equity prices.
4 Girouard et al. (2006) and the International Monetary Fund (2003)
examine the recent rapid appreciation of house prices in many
countries and house price cycles that have occurred since 1970.
1 Because data on median household income for 2005 are not yet
available, Figure 1 shows data on the ratio of HPI to household
income through 2004. Wheelock
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HPI/Median Household Income: U.S. and Selected States: 1995-2004A historical perspective is necessarily
restricted to the fairly recent past because com-
prehensive data on house prices are not available
before the 1970s. Nevertheless, the past 30 years
contains a rich history of housing booms and
busts among U.S. states and cities. Here, I focus
on large movements in house prices—measured
using the state-level, repeat-sales HPI produced
by the OFHEO—that occurred between 1980 and
1999.5
First, I sought to determine whether episodes
of rapid house price appreciation (“booms”) are
typically followed by large declines in nominal
house prices (“busts”) and whether large declines
are typically preceded by large appreciations.
Empirically, I define a “boom” as an increase in
the ratio of HPI to state per capita income (HPI/
PCY) of at least 7 percent (annual rate) for three or
more consecutive quarters. For the United States
as a whole, HPI/PCY increased at a 6.2 percent rate
during the year ending 2005:Q1 and at an average
5.4 percent annual rate during 2001:Q1–2005:Q1.
Seventeen states experienced annualized HPI/PCY
growth rates of at least 7 percent for three or more
quarters between 2001 and 2005.6
U.S. states experienced 20 house price booms
(i.e., annualized HPI/PCY growth of at least 7
percent for three or more quarters) between 1980
and 1999. Table 1 lists these episodes and the
average annualized growth rate of HPI/PCY dur-
ing each episode. For booms that were followed
by a fall in nominal house prices, the table also
identifies the quarter in which the HPI reached
its peak and the subsequent percentage decline
in the index.7 Some booms were not followed by
a decline in nominal HPI, but simply by a slowing
of the rate of growth of HPI/PCY to under 7 per-
cent. In these cases, the columns labeled “HPI
Peak” and “Subsequent Decline in HPI” are not
applicable (“N/A”).
Of the 20 booms listed in Table 1, ten were
followed within a few quarters by a decline in the
nominal HPI of at least 5 percent and nine were
followed by declines of more than 10 percent. The
other ten booms were followed by periods of either
slowly rising or flat house prices. Apparently,
the adage that “what goes up, must come down,”
does not always apply to the housing market.
I define a “bust” as a decline in nominal HPI of
at least 10 percent over a period of four or more
quarters from an HPI peak to an HPI trough.8 I
define housing busts in terms of nominal HPI,
rather than HPI/PCY or some other relative meas-
ure, because mortgage loans are contracted for
nominal amounts. Thus, a decline in nominal
house prices necessarily produces a decline in
household wealth, which will more likely increase
loan default rates than a decline in relative house
prices that occurs without a decline in nominal
prices.
To identify HPI peaks and troughs, I first
identified all index observations that equaled the
maximum or minimum values of the index within
a rolling, nine-quarter window. I then eliminated
all but the highest of any consecutive maximums
and lowest of any consecutive minimums, to
ensure that peaks and troughs alternate, and com-
puted the percentage decline in the HPI between
the remaining peaks and troughs. 
Between 1980 and 1999, there were 17
instances in which a state experienced a nominal
HPI decline of at least 10 percent over four or
more quarters. Table 2 presents information about
each bust, which I list in four groups. For each
episode, the table lists the date of the HPI peak
(which I define as the start of the bust) and the
percentage decline in the HPI to its subsequent
minimum point (which I define as the end of the
bust). The table also indicates whether a bust was
preceded by a boom, defined, as above, as three
or more consecutive quarters of HPI/PCY growth
of at least 7 percent. I also report the total number
of quarters (not necessarily consecutive) in which
Wheelock
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5 The HPI begins in 1975, but data before about 1980 are very noisy,
especially for smaller states. 
6 Arguably, it would be preferable to measure house prices against
household income. However, annual, state-level household income
data are not available prior to 1984.
7 The nominal HPI peak usually occurred in the same quarter as
the HPI/PCY peak. The percentage decline in nominal HPI is from
the HPI peak quarter to the quarter in which the HPI reached its
low point before a subsequent peak.
8 I impose the requirement that busts occur over at least four quarters
because the HPI’s for a few small states exhibit considerable
volatility, especially in early years, with large declines in the
index in some quarters followed immediately by large increases
in the next quarter. By focusing on HPI declines lasting at least
four quarters, I avoid defining such volatility as booms or busts.HPI/PCY grew at an annual rate of at least 7 per-
cent during the 24 quarters before each bust.9 Ten
busts were preceded by a boom.10 Finally, I also
report data on HPI/PCY and the ratio of HPI to
median household income (HPI/HY) in the quarter
of the HPI peak preceding each bust.11 For com-
parison, I also present recent levels of HPI/PCY
and HPI/HY (2005:Q1 for HPI/PCY and 2004 for
HPI/HY).
The house price busts of Iowa, Michigan,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin (and to a lesser
extent of other Midwestern states) occurred during
the recessions of 1980 and 1981-82.12 Both farm
Wheelock
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9 Most busts occurred after several quarters of stagnant house prices,
rather than immediately after a period of rapidly rising prices. 
10 The case of Montana was unusual among the ten busts in that the
state’s nominal HPI peak occurred in the second of the three con-
secutive quarters of HPI/PCY growth in excess of 7 percent
(1983:Q4–1984:Q2). In all other cases, the HPI peak came after
the period of rapid HPI/PCY growth.
Table 1
State House Price Booms, 1980-99
Average growth in  Subsequent decline in 
State Boom period* HPI/PCY† (%) HPI peak HPI‡ (%)
AK 1981:Q2–1982:Q3, 1984:Q1 8.7 1984:Q3 43.7
AK 1990:Q3–1991:Q2, 1991:Q4 11.3 N/A§ N/A
CA 1988:Q2–1990:Q1 11.9 1990:Q3 14.4
CO 1994:Q1–1994:Q3 7.7 N/A N/A
CT 1985:Q2–1987:Q4 12.5 1988:Q2 20.7
DE 1986:Q4–1987:Q2 7.8 1993:Q2 3.1
HI 1988:Q3–1992:Q2 11.3 1994:Q3 17.8
MA 1984:Q1–1987:Q2 11.7 1989:Q4 12.2
ME 1985:Q4–1987:Q4 7.9 1989:Q4 11.6
MI 1987:Q1–1987:Q3 8.1 N/A N/A
MT 1983:Q4–1984:Q2 9.4 1984:Q1 13.1
MT 1994:Q1–1994:Q4 9.7 N/A N/A
NH 1985:Q2–1987:Q2 12.0 1989:Q4 22.1
NJ 1985:Q3–1987:Q4 12.2 1988:Q3 7.8
NY 1985:Q1–1987:Q3 10.3 1989:Q4 4.7
OR 1990:Q2–1991:Q1 8.5 N/A N/A
PA 1987:Q1–1988:Q2 8.1 N/A N/A
RI 1985:Q4–1988:Q1 15.7 1989:Q4 14.1
UT 1993:Q3–1994:Q4 9.9 N/A N/A
WA 1989:Q4–1990:Q4 12.5 N/A N/A
NOTE: *Quarters in which year-over-year percentage increase in HPI/PCY exceeded 7 percent. †Average year-over-year percentage
increase in HPI/PCY from first quarter in which growth exceeded 7 percent to the last quarter of HPI/PCY growth in excess of 7 percent,
including any intervening quarters in which growth was below 7 percent. ‡Percentage decline in nominal HPI from the quarter in which
the nominal HPI reached its peak to the quarter in which HPI reached its low value before a subsequent peak; the quarter of the
nominal HPI peak was frequently the same quarter that HPI/PCY peaked. §Not applicable; these booms were not followed by a
decline in nominal HPI, but simply a decline in the growth rate of HPI/PCY to less than 7 percent.
11 State-level data on median household income are not available
before 1984.
12 Other states that experienced declines in nominal house prices at
this time include Missouri (–7.9 percent), Nebraska (–5.0 percent),
and Ohio (–5.4 percent). North Dakota and South Dakota also appear
to have experienced large house price declines, but the HPIs for
both states exhibit too much volatility to measure the size of their
declines.and so-called “Rust Belt” states, whose incomes
derive relatively heavily from older manufactur-
ing industries, such as automobiles and steel,
suffered large income declines during these two
recessions. During 1980-82, Iowa, Wisconsin, West
Virginia, and Michigan ranked 42nd, 44th, 45th,
and 50th, respectively, among all states in real
personal income growth, and 45th, 40th, 48th, and
50th in employment growth. None of the states
experienced a particularly large increase in house
prices before its bust. Among them, only Michigan
experienced any quarters of HPI/PCY growth
above 7 percent before house prices started to fall.
The second wave of state house price busts
was associated with a sharp decline in energy
prices. After rising rapidly during the 1970s, the
price of oil peaked in mid-1980 at almost $40 per
barrel. The price of oil then declined to about $30
per barrel in 1982-84, before plunging to a low of
under $12 in 1986. Although real personal income
grew at an average annual rate of 0.97 percent
during 1985-87 for the United States as a whole,
Alaska, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Wyoming experienced far slower growth rates
of –0.29 percent, –0.19 percent, 0.10 percent,
–0.19 percent, 0.43 percent, and –0.61 percent.
Among the six energy-producing states that
had large declines in nominal house prices, only
Alaska and Montana experienced house price
booms before their busts. Several of the states
witnessed rapid rates of both residential and non-
residential construction, however, which some
analysts argue contributed to the subsequent
collapse of real estate values (Hanc, 1998).
Wheelock
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Table 2
State House Price Busts, 1980-99
A. Early-1980s farm and Rust Belt collapse
State IA MI WI WV
HPI peak quarter 1980:Q3 1981:Q3 1980:Q3 1981:Q2
HPI % decline 14.4 11.2 18.4 29.5
Boom before bust? No Yes No No
Quarters before bust that HPI/PCY growth 0 4 0 0
exceeded 7 percent
Peak HPI/PCY 1.121 1.017 1.077 1.605
HPI/PCY 2005:Q1 0.726 0.977 0.917 0.814
Peak HPI/HY N/A N/A N/A N/A
HPI/HY 2004 0.53 0.74 0.65 0.64
B. Mid-1980s drop in energy prices
State AK LA MT OK TX WY
HPI peak quarter 1984:Q3 1983:Q2 1984:Q1 1983:Q4 1986:Q2 1982:Q4
HPI % decline 43.7 16.4 13.1 26.3 15.7 38.1
Boom before bust? Yes No Yes No No No
Quarters before bust that HPI/PCY growth  7 2 3 1 0 3
exceeded 7 percent
Peak HPI/PCY 0.777 1.216 1.060 1.085 1.093 0.926
HPI/PCY 2005:Q1 0.656 0.721 1.041 0.627 0.613 0.606
Peak HPI/HY 0.46 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.56 N/A
HPI/HY 2004 0.41 0.56 0.87 0.45 0.47 0.47In contrast with the house price busts of the
first two groups of states, which for the most part
did not follow booms, all of the busts among the
states in the third and fourth groups did follow
booms. States that had busts in the late 1980s and
early 1990s have higher population densities and
generally less land available for new construction
around their principal cities than states that expe-
rienced busts in the early-to-mid 1980s. These
differences might explain why the states in the
third and fourth groups experienced rapid house
price appreciation before their declines when
states in the first and second groups did not.
Interestingly, most of the states in the third and
fourth groups have experienced rapid growth in
HPI-to-income measures since 2000; and, as of
2005:Q1, several had price-to-income ratios that
equaled or exceeded the levels reached before
their earlier house price busts.
New England experienced rapid growth of
income and employment, and a real estate boom,
during the national recovery from the 1981-82
recession and subsequent expansion. The New
England economy slowed toward the end of the
decade, however, when cuts in federal defense
spending and increased competition in the com-
puter industry had a disproportionately large
impact on the region.13 Among U.S. census
regions, New England experienced the largest
decline in real personal income during the reces-
sion of 1990-91, with an average annual growth
rate of –1.02 percent, compared with an average
Wheelock
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13 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, 1997, p. 340).
Table 2, cont’d
State House Price Busts, 1980-99
C. New England real estate crash
State CT MA ME NH RI
HPI peak quarter 1988:Q2 1989:Q4 1989:Q4 1989:Q4 1989:Q4
HPI % decline 20.7 12.2 11.6 22.1 14.1
Boom before bust? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarters before bust that HPI/PCY growth  11 14 7 9 10
exceeded 7 percent
Peak HPI/PCY 1.140 1.534 1.477 1.298 1.421
HPI/PCY 2005:Q1 0.895 1.590 1.498 1.219 1.550
Peak HPI/HY 0.78 0.95 0.94 0.74 0.88
HPI/HY 2004 0.75 1.26 1.08 0.79 1.11
D. Early-to-mid 1990s defense cutbacks and Japanese financial crisis
State CA HI
HPI peak quarter 1990:Q3 1994:Q3
HPI % decline 14.4 17.8
Boom before bust? Yes Yes
Quarters before bust that HPI/PCY growth  8 12
exceeded 7 percent
Peak HPI/PCY 1.072 1.155
HPI/PCY 2005:Q1 1.450 1.245
Peak HPI/HY 0.69 0.72
HPI/HY 2004 1.03 0.72of –0.40 percent for the United States as a whole.
Although forces external to New England triggered
the region’s real estate downturn, many analysts
concluded that real estate prices had risen faster
than could be justified by fundamentals during
the boom, which exacerbated the subsequent
collapse.14
California’s experience was similar to that of
New England. The state’s economy expanded
rapidly in the 1980s, but began to slow when
federal defense expenditures were cut toward the
end of the decade. Continued strong demand for
civilian aircraft and increased NASA expenditures
offset the impact of defense spending cuts for a
time, as did the greater diversity of the northern
California economy. Commercial and residential
real estate prices plunged, however, when the
recession finally took hold.15 California experi-
enced a larger decline in economic activity during
the 1990-91 recession than did the United States
as a whole, with an average real personal income
growth rate of –0.67 percent, compared with the
U.S. average rate of –0.40 percent. 
Hawaii was the last state to experience a
house price bust in the 1990s. A strong state econ-
omy and heavy buying by Japanese investors con-
tributed to a rapid appreciation of Hawaii’s real
estate from the late 1980s through 1991. HPI/PCY
rose at a rate in excess of 7 percent over 12 consec-
utive quarters between 1988 and 1991. Hawaii’s
boom ended when Japan’s stock and real estate
markets collapsed and the U.S. economy was
struggling to recover from the 1990-91 recession
(Ablan, 2004).
House Price Busts, Income Growth,
and Banking Conditions
A systematic examination of real economic
activity and banking conditions during each of
the 17 large declines in nominal HPI listed in
Table 2 reveals common characteristics of these
events, especially about the timing of changes in
economic activity and banking conditions during
bust episodes. The following are some general
observations: 
• House price declines typically followed an
economic shock, such as a decline in com-
modity prices, a cutback in government
expenditures, etc., and frequently came
after a period of rising interest rates. HPI
peaks usually coincided with or followed
declines in state personal income growth
and other measures of general economic
activity.
• House prices often continued to fall after
economic activity had begun to recover.
• Banks experienced loan losses and falling
net income after house prices started to
decline. Bank holdings of nonperforming
loans and “other real estate owned” (a meas-
ure of foreclosed property) typically rose
sharply about eight quarters after an HPI
peak. Most states also experienced an
increase in bank and thrift failures at this
time.16
Figures 3 through 6 illustrate these patterns
for the case of Massachusetts, which is somewhat
representative. Massachusetts and other New
England states experienced a classic real estate
boom/bust cycle and banking crisis. After increas-
ing rapidly over the preceding six years,
Massachusetts house (and other real estate) prices
reached a plateau in early 1989 and peaked in the
fourth quarter of that year. State personal income
growth declined a few quarters before house prices
peaked and became negative in the first quarter
of 1989 (Figures 3 and 4). Massachusetts experi-
enced a deeper and slightly longer decline in real
personal income during the 1990-91 recession
than did the United States as a whole. After falling
some 12 percent, nominal house prices reached
a low point in 1992:Q2, two quarters after real
personal income had begun to rise.
Massachusetts banks experienced heavy losses
and numerous failures as a result of real estate
loan defaults, and the aggregate return on equity
(ROE) of the state’s banks was below the national
average for six quarters beginning in 1989:Q4
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14 See FDIC (1997, Chap. 10) and references therein.
15 California’s experience is described in FDIC (1997, Chap. 11).
16 Thrift institutions include savings and loan associations, savings
banks, and similar depository institutions. Data on bank and thrift
failures are available on the website of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation: www.fdic.gov.Wheelock
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Massachusetts Housing Bust and Bank Loan Performance(Figure 5). Typical of banks in other states with
sharp declines in real estate prices, Massachusetts
banks experienced a large increase in nonperform-
ing loans and other real estate owned (OREO,
which reflects foreclosures) as a percentage of total
assets, peaking four quarters after house prices
had begun to decline (Figure 6). Massachusetts
experienced a surge in bank failures. Although
just one Massachusetts bank failed in 1989, seven
failed in 1990, 14 failed in 1991, and 16 failed in
1992. These 38 failures represented 37 percent
of the total number of Massachusetts banks in
operation at the end of 1988.17
The patterns illustrated in Figures 3 through
6 do not, of course, indicate whether the decline
in house prices contributed to the decline in real
personal income. Loan losses eroded bank capital
and impaired the ability of financial institutions
to extend credit, however, suggesting that a
“capital crunch” may have contributed to the
decline in economic activity.18 Indeed, then-
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (2004)
blamed “financial headwinds” associated with
the weak capital positions of U.S. banks for the
unusually slow recovery of the U.S. economy
from the recession of 1990-91.
ARE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
CURRENTLY VULNERABLE TO 
A HOUSE PRICE COLLAPSE?
Various measures suggest that U.S. banks
have become increasingly exposed to residential
real estate since 2000.19 Two measures are plot-
ted in Figures 7 and 8. The first plots quarterly
observations on the stock of bank loans on 1- to
4-family residential property plus the market value
of bank holdings of mortgage-backed securities
(excluding those issued or guaranteed by a U.S.
government agency or enterprise), all divided by
total U.S. commercial bank assets. The second
plots the stock of untapped home equity lines at
banks divided by total bank assets. Both figures
show that as a percentage of total assets, banks’
exposure to residential real estate increased sub-
stantially over the five years ending in 2005:Q1.20
These simple exposure measures indicate
little, however, about whether banks have become
more vulnerable to a decline in house prices. With-
out information about the risks of specific assets
held by banks, one cannot determine definitively
how vulnerable banks are to a decline in house
prices. However, alongside the large increase in
the size of bank residential real estate portfolios
has been a substantial increase in bank equity-
capital relative to total bank assets. The greater
a bank’s capital, the larger the amount of loan
defaults and other declines in asset value it can
withstand before becoming insolvent. Because
capital serves as a cushion against loan and secu-
rity losses, the increase in real estate loans and
securities as a share of bank assets is probably less
worrisome than it otherwise would have been. 
Of course, banks might have increased their
capital in recent years to compensate for increased
risks in their real estate loan portfolios or other
assets. Still, banks in general have a larger cush-
ion against possible losses now than they did at
the end of the 1990s. Between 1999:Q1 and
2005:Q1, capital increased from 8.5 percent of
total bank assets to 9.9 percent of total assets, as
illustrated in Figure 9. Hence, banks’ exposure to
residential real estate as a fraction of total capital,
which is illustrated in Figure 10, increased much
less dramatically than did exposure as a fraction
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17 Massachusetts also had 28 unassisted bank mergers between 1989
and 1992, and the number of banks in the state declined from 103
at the end of 1988 to 61 at the end of 1992 (FDIC web site:
www2.fdic.gov/hsob/hsobRpt.asp).
18 Peek and Rosengren (1992) present evidence of a capital crunch
(i.e., a reduction in the supply of loans associated with impaired
capital) among New England banks.
19 Of course, many other financial intermediaries are involved in
the mortgage market, including thrifts, private mortgage insurers,
and government-sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. I focus here on commercial banks because they are
more central to the monetary transmission mechanism and pay-
ments system and because comparable historical data on other
intermediaries are less complete.
20 Broader measures that include all residential real estate bank loans
show similar trends. The stock of bank loans on 1- to 4-family resi-
dential property plus the market value of bank holdings of mortgage-
backed securities (excluding those issued or guaranteed by a U.S.
government agency or enterprise) is computed as the sum of the
following items from the reports of income and condition (call
reports) that banks file quarterly with federal banking authorities:
RCON1430, RCFD0409, RCFD1710, RCFD1713, RCFD1734, and
RCFD1736. Total bank assets is call report item number RCFD1710.
Untapped home equity lines of credit is item number RCFD3814. Wheelock
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Figure 8
Home Equity Lines Not Drawn, U.S. Bank Average, 1994:Q1-2005:Q1Wheelock
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Figure 10
Residential Real Estate Exposure/Capital, U.S. Bank Average, 1994:Q1-2005:Q1of total bank assets. As of 2005:Q1, U.S. banks
held about $2 of 1- to 4-family residential real
estate loans and non-government-issued or non-
government-guaranteed mortgage-backed securi-
ties for every $1 of capital, roughly 8 percent more
than in the late 1990s. 
The U.S. banking industry today is consider-
ably better capitalized than it was in the 1980s
and early 1990s. Interstate branching, which has
been permitted only since 1997, makes cross-
state comparisons of bank exposure to real estate
(as well as other measures of bank condition)
less meaningful today than in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.21 As a whole, however, U.S. banks
currently are less exposed to residential real estate
than were banks located in most states that had
large house price declines in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. 
Figure 11 plots residential real estate exposure
as a percentage of bank capital from 1985:Q1 to
1995:Q4 for banks located in four states that suf-
fered a large decline in house prices in the early
1990s. The quarter in which the HPI attained its
peak in each state is marked on the figure. In
2005:Q1, U.S. commercial bank holdings of 1-
to 4-family residential real estate loans and non-
government-issued or non-government-guaranteed
mortgage-backed securities totaled 200 percent of
aggregate bank capital. Massachusetts banks had
a comparable level of residential real estate expo-
sure, at 214 percent of capital, when the state HPI
peak was reached in 1989:Q4. Massachusetts
banks were, however, considerably more exposed
to nonresidential real estate in 1989 than U.S.
banks were in 2005. For example, the total real
estate loans of Massachusetts banks in 1989:Q4
equaled 551 percent of bank capital, whereas the
total real estate loans of U.S. banks as a whole in
2005:Q1 equaled 308 percent of bank capital. 
The other three states for which data are
shown in Figure 11 all had considerably greater
exposure to residential real estate at their HPI
peaks than did U.S. banks in 2005:Q1. Banks of
most other northeastern states that experienced
Wheelock
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21 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act





























Residential Real Estate Exposure/Capital, Selected States, 1985:Q1-1995:Q4large declines in house prices in the early 1990s
had similarly high exposure levels.22 Thus, U.S.
banks today are, on the whole, less exposed to
residential real estate than were banks located in
states that experienced large declines in residen-
tial real estate prices in the early 1990s. This sug-
gests that a decline in house prices today of a size
comparable to those experienced by New England
states or California in the early 1990s would have
less impact on the U.S. banking system than it did
on New England banks in the early 1990s.
Aggregate exposure measures do not, of course,
reveal the extent of variation across banks. In gen-
eral, large banks tend to have more exposure to
residential real estate, and also hold less capital
as a percentage of total assets, than small banks.
Table 3 presents data for 2005:Q1 on residential
real estate exposure and capital-to-asset ratios
for banks in each asset-size quartile. Residential
real estate exposure is lowest and the aggregate
capital-to-asset ratio is highest for banks in quar-
tile 1, which comprises the smallest 25 percent
of U.S. banks in terms of total assets. Across suc-
cessive quartiles, exposure rises and capital-to-
assets ratios fall.23
On the surface, the negative association
between residential real estate exposure and
capital-to-assets ratios across quartiles might sug-
gest that larger banks are generally more vulnerable
to a decline in residential real estate prices than
small banks. Without information about the spe-
cific loans and securities that comprise a bank’s
portfolio, however, one cannot judge how vulner-
able a given bank is to a decline in house prices.
For example, a bank with a geographically diversi-
fied real estate loan portfolio would be less vulner-
able to a localized decline in real estate prices than
a bank with a less diversified portfolio. Thus, if
larger banks are better able to diversify their port-
folios than small banks, they could maintain higher
ratios of real estate loans to capital without neces-
sarily being more vulnerable to a decline in real
estate prices. Similarly, if larger banks are more
adept at hedging portfolio risk through the use of
derivative securities or other means, they could
operate with lower capital-to-asset ratios than
smaller banks without being any more vulnerable
to a decline in real estate markets.
Wheelock
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Table 3
Commercial Bank Residential Real Estate Exposure by Asset Quartile, 2005:Q1
Quartile* Exposure/assets† HELC/assets‡ Capital/assets§ Exposure/capital¶
1 0.15 0.01 0.13 1.14
2 0.17 0.01 0.11 1.62
3 0.18 0.02 0.10 1.82
4 0.20 0.05 0.10 2.02
NOTE: *Quartiles 1 through 4 consist, respectively, of banks with less than $53 million, $53 to $106 million, $106 to $238 million, and
more than $238 million of assets. †The stock of loans on 1- to 4-family residential property plus the market value of bank holdings of
mortgage-backed securities (excluding those issued or guaranteed by a U.S. government agency or enterprise), all divided by total assets
for all banks in the given quartile. ‡The stock of untapped home equity lines of credit divided by total assets for all banks in the given
quartile. §The ratio of tier-1 equity-capital to assets for all banks in the given quartile. ¶The stock of loans on 1- to 4-family residential
property plus the market value of bank holdings of mortgage-backed securities (excluding those issued or guaranteed by a U.S. govern-
ment agency or enterprise), all divided by total equity-capital for all banks in the given quartile.
22 Among states that had large house price declines, ratios of 1- to 4-
family residential property loans plus non-government-issued or
non-government-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities to total
bank capital were as follows (HPI peak quarter): CA, 3.01 (1990:Q3),
CT, 4.03 (1989:Q4), MA, 2.14 (1989:Q4), ME, 3.07 (1989:Q4), NH,
3.18 (1989:Q4), NJ, 2.68 (1988:Q3), RI, 1.71 (1989:Q4). As of
2005:Q1, the ratio for U.S. banks was 2.00.
23 Quartiles 1 through 4 consist, respectively, of banks with total
assets of less than $53 million, between $53 million and $106
million, between $106 million and $238 million, and more than
$238 million.CONCLUSION
The rapid increase in U.S. house prices since
2000 has prompted concerns about the possible
effects of a sharp decline in house prices on
financial institutions and macroeconomic activity.
Evidence from other countries suggests that
declining house prices, especially when pre-
ceded by a period of rapid house price apprecia-
tion, can have a marked contractionary impact
on macroeconomic activity. This article looks to
the experiences of U.S. states for evidence about
house price booms and busts. This review finds
that house price booms have not always led to
busts and that busts do not always follow booms.
Sharp declines in nominal house prices in farm
and manufacturing states in the early 1980s, and
in energy-producing states in the mid-1980s,
were not generally preceded by periods of rapid
house price appreciation. The large declines in
house prices experienced in New England states,
California, and Hawaii in the late 1980s and early
1990s, however, were preceded by extended
periods of rapid growth in house prices relative
to personal income.
Banking conditions deteriorated markedly
in all states that experienced a large decline in
nominal house prices during the 1980s or 1990s.
Within a few quarters of the start of a decline,
banks experienced increased loan defaults and
falling income. Several states that had large
declines in real estate prices also witnessed
increases in bank failures, as well as more severe
declines in economic activity than did the United
States as a whole. Additional research is required,
however, to determine whether either the decline
in real estate prices or the deterioration of banking
conditions caused state income growth to lag the
national average.
U.S. banks, as a whole, have become increas-
ingly exposed to residential real estate since 2000,
as reflected in increases in their holding of real
estate loans and securities and in the amount of
available home equity lines of credit as a percent-
age of total bank assets. Bank capital has also
increased, however, which makes the increase in
residential real estate exposure less worrisome
than it would otherwise be. Further, a portion of
the residential real estate loans and securities held
by banks are guaranteed by third parties, and
many banks purchase only highly rated securities
that have little credit risk.24
Although they have become more exposed to
residential real estate since 2000, U.S. banks as a
whole appear considerably less vulnerable to a
decline in residential real estate prices than were
banks located in states that experienced large
house price declines in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Further, the proliferation of interstate
branching that has occurred since 1997 suggests
that, today, banks in general are probably less
vulnerable to local real estate shocks than in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. 
In sum, U.S. banks seem well positioned to
withstand a modest decline in house prices,
especially a localized decline. Still, empirical
evidence from the United States and other coun-
tries indicates that declines in housing wealth
can have severe macroeconomic repercussions,
especially if banking system capital does become
impaired.
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